The Cost of the EU CFP (Common Fisheries Policy) to the UK economy, and legal / constitutional procedures for withdrawal  

The economic loss to Scotland and the UK

Scotland

In order to calculate the current cost of the damage to Scotland’s economy by the application of the EU Common Fisheries Policy, it is necessary to examine the situation that would have prevailed without the CFP and compare that the prevailing situation inside the CFP.

To do this we assume firstly that the fleet size remained constant over the 30 years, but that technological improvements in gear and equipment continued.  We also assume that there was no reduction in stocks over the period. 

While some may question that, we point to the systematic annual destruction of up to 600,000 tonnes of edible fish by the CFP enforced discarding of fish caught that were excess to particular single species quotas.  We contend that outside of the CFP these fish would have survived or been marketed in Scotland, and that there would have been no harvesting of demersal fish in Scottish waters by continental vessels, and no industrial fishing by Danish fleets serving the fish meal industry.  Neither would Scotland have been robbed of access to its deepwater stocks as when the EC introduced a quota on these and allocated it largely to Spain and France.  Scots deep water vessels had then to go to Greenland and Namibia to fish.

In addition we accept the analysis by fishery scientist Jon Kristjonsson and others that the ICES / EU management measures to protect cod stocks, are having a reverse effect.  This has been soundly proven in the Faeroe Isles case following that country’s shift from an ICES / EU advised system of quota slashing and fleet reduction, to their new system based on effort controls and actual production.    

Multiply by GDP impact ratio 2.35 makes a loss of  £ 382.58 million based on the current production only.

However, between 1973 and 2003 there was a drop in catch per unit effort.  The average catch per demersal vessel (all sizes) was

                                            1973                            2003

                                             97.5 tonnes                 41.6 tonnes

This drop in catch per vessel occurred despite considerable technical improvements in trawl nets, electronics, engine power and deck machinery.  Why ?   The answer lies in the rigid application of quotas and effort regulations, and the enforced discarding of up to 600,000 tonnes of fish a year at sea (ICES estimates), plus the operation of EU fleets in Scottish (UK EEZ) waters.  (When Spain joined the EU its enormous fleet almost doubled the size of the total EU fishing fleet.)  Other factors that affected catch decline included the UK’s refusal to cull a mushrooming seal population that was taking more fish than the local fishing fleets around the west coast and islands.

The following quotation from the European Fisheries Fund, Scottish National Strategy Plan (released recently by SEERAD), confirms the drop in fleet size and effort :  “there were 50% fewer vessels in the over 10m whitefish segment at the end of 2003 as compared with 1993.  This has delivered a 30% reduction in fishing effort in the sector of the fleet that tends to target cod with a further 35% reduction in effort being delivered through the quota and days at sea restrictions under the EU Cod Recovery Plan.”

Therefore – without the quota system and enforced discarding, the 2003 production of the Scottish demersal fleet should have been more than double the 99,654 tonnes.  Furthermore, if the fleet at its 1973 size in numbers had continued to improve technologically, and if the stock had not been depleted by discarding and the entry of EU fleets into the UK EEZ, then the production would have been over 4 times 99,654, or around 400,000 tonnes worth £ 400 million at today’s values.  The difference between that figure and the 1973 demersal catch is 137,590 tonnes which would represent the technological advances in gear and equipment over the 30 year period (assuming the fish were present to be caught).   

400 million times 2.35 would give a sector value of £ 940 million a year.  With the other costs mentioned below, the economic loss Scotland has suffered from the drastic reduction of its demersal fleet is close to one billion pounds a year at present values. 

Some will argue that there was not fish enough in the sea to support the original level of effort.  We argue that there was – provided Scotland retained its share of the UK 200 mile EEZ  and if EU fleets were not permitted to harvest its demersal resources whether for human consumption or as in Denmark’s case, for industrial use. The annual destruction of up to 600,000 tonnes of edible fish by enforced discarding shows that the CFP actually destroyed more fish than the Scottish fleet was capable of catching at its original (1973) size.

However, if one insists that technological improvements since 1973 would have led to a smaller increase in production per unit effort, given the same stock situation and the same number of vessels, then the potential size of the catch by the non-CFP Scottish fleet, would have to lie somewhere between 262,413 and 400,000 tonnes.  

To the direct economic loss must be added the indirect loss suffered by the small ports and communities that have declined or stagnated since the demersal fleet reduction (Buckie, Lossiemouth, Scrabster, Kinlochbervie, Lochinver, Oban, Ayr, and the smaller west coast and island harbours are examples).  Many small processors closed down or reduced the number of employees as local fish supplies dwindled.  Scores of experienced local fishers, engineers, processors and boat builders, with a lifetime of valuable knowledge and ability, were pushed into early retirement and a state of idleness.  One of the authors investigated the market for premises left vacant by fishery-dependent firms in affected ports.  Most of them remained vacant as there was little alternative demand for commercial property.
 
In addition the cost of unemployment and welfare support of displaced fishers and shore sector workers should be considered along with the direct economic losses.  The offshore oil industry absorbed much of the displaced fisher labour, - but offshore oil was going to be there anyway, and should have been a supplement, not a replacement for fishery sector employment.  

The larger fish processors that have remained in business have had to import increasing amounts of raw material to replace local landings.  The import cost of Scotland’s fish supply has reduced Scotland from a net exporter of fish or fish products, to a position where imports and exports are about level.  In this case, we refer to all movements of fish in and out of Scotland, whether to or from Europe, Scandinavia, Russia or England.

The ‘with’ and ‘without’ scenario would then be as follows :

UK

DEFRA has stated that the UK catching industry lands over £540 million pounds in catches each year, resulting in between £800 – £1200 million of economic activity in the UK.

However the value of fisheries products, at landing values, extracted annually from the British Exclusive Fishing Zone, amounts to £2.5 to £3 billion pounds, of which a mere £540 million goes to the British Industry.

That represents a loss of between £ 2.0 and £ 2.5 billion to the UK economy. 
 
That on the one hand is a measure of how much the UK has lost to the CFP, but much more importantly it is also a measure of how much Britain has to gain from national control.

The Scotsman
Edinburgh                                         19 December 2005

Kara Brydson’s article on the EU fisheries negotiations points out the highly endangered condition of fish stocks, but fails to point out the root cause of the situation. For centuries the fishing industry maintained a healthy balance between resources and exploitation, but it took only a few years of dilettante interference from Brussels to reduce this once thriving industry to its present state of biological, environmental, economic and social disaster.

The Brussels talks are all based on the lunatic principle of allocating quotas for individual fish species within mixed species fisheries. That will be possible only when someone invents a net that can be programmed to catch only one species of fish. As it is, the inevitable result of this failed attempt at management is massive discarding of perfectly saleable by-catches to feed seagulls, or the more sensible landing of these as “black fish”, and disastrous damage to fish stocks overall.

The expression “Common” Fisheries Policy actually conceals the pernicious truth that the CFP de facto applies only to UK and especially to Scottish waters. There are much looser local regimes in the likes of the Mediterranean and the Baltic. Its purpose from the very beginning had nothing to do with management and conservation, in both of which respects it has been an unmitigated failure.

It was purely and simply a tactic by the original EEC members to obtain open access to the well-conserved UK and Norwegian waters. Edward Heath and his team were able to concede the point because three quarters of the UK fishing industry was Scottish, and that was “expendable”, to quote the relevant Scottish Office records of the time.

The result to date of this Brussels intrigue and London treachery has been the destruction of two thirds of the Scottish industry, with devastating economic and social consequences.

Attempts have been made recently to hoodwink the Scottish public by presenting statistics claiming that the Scottish fishing fleet is now stable year on year at a total of around 2,400 active boats.

What is not revealed is that this total includes a large number of small inshore boats, mostly one-man lobster boats and the like, down to the size of rowing boats, which previously were never included in the statistics.

The vital figures are those for the offshore fleet consisting of boats of 10 metres length and more with the main catching and earning capacity.

In round figures, in 1975 there were almost 1,800 offshore boats operating out of Scottish ports. By 2005 these had been reduced to around 600, with the main demersal white fish fleet down to a rump.

I do not have the very latest statistics, but it is clear that this piratical EU “policy” has made devastating inroads into the Scottish national economy all the way downstream from the fish catching sector and its ancillaries.

This can be accurately assessed on the basis of five-year averages. Present incomplete research indicates that the removal of around 1,200 boats from the main fleet is costing Scotland well over £1,000m (€1,500m) in lost wealth creation every single year – more than £200 for every member of the Scottish population.

I see no remedy for this situation being obtained within the EU, let alone the CFP. The only answer is the return of fisheries to national control. And if that means that an independent Scotland has to leave the EU – or, more correctly, refuse to join it – then so be it.

Dr. James Wilkie