Security and Defence
The concept of security has taken on a whole new range of meanings since the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War. The danger of a major global war has receded, but it has been replaced by a whole series of local armed conflicts as well as other threats to security like the illegal arms trade, undemocratic governmental systems, terrorism, organised international crime, mass uncontrolled migration, the illicit drug trade, trafficking in persons, and other threats that are not susceptible to military solutions.
We should therefore be under no illusion that the Age of Gold has arrived. Scotland must have the civilian and military forces equipped to deal with these threats within a global system of cooperation, because there can be no security for any country, however large and powerful, in the midst of an insecure world. The prime example is the “9/11” terrorist attacks on the US World Trade Center and Pentagon in September 2001, which were planned and organised from a number of centres in four continents.
The whole system of countering threats to national and international security is necessarily changing, because the nature of the threats themselves has changed.
The actual size and composition of the civilian and military land, sea and air forces required can be ascertained only after a comprehensive assessment of current threats and future security requirements. Their tasks will also include foreign military assignments under United Nations auspices, fisheries protection, air-sea rescue, operations against drug and weapon smugglers, and much else, many of which will involve close civilian/military cooperation.
In a country of Scotland’s size there will have to be a large emphasis on volunteer militia and other forces for backup purposes in emergencies. Meantime, Scotland’s traditional regimental system, the value of which has been proved over centuries, should be maintained within the new rationalised structure, i.e. by retaining traditional regimental identities.
Scotland must seek membership of international organisations that provide cast-iron guarantees of its national security and territorial integrity. In this context there is no substitute for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which for half a century has served the free world well, and in its new role will help secure world peace in the future. NATO, in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, remains the spearhead for operations against international terrorism. NATO’s Partnership for Peace and its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council also encompass a whole range of non-member and neutral countries, including Russia.
Another essential source of security is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which in fact surrounds the entire northern hemisphere, literally from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE, which the Russians still regard as Europe’s premier security system, played a key role in ending the Cold War. It has drastically reduced size of military forces and the amount of military hardware in Europe, and has complemented NATO operations on many occasions in the Balkans and elsewhere. Here, too, Scottish membership is essential.
On the other hand, there is no appreciable value in the current development of a military capability for the European Union, which unnecessarily duplicates NATO functions. It is motivated primarily by integrationist euro-ideology rather than military necessity.
The Western European Union no longer operates as an organisation, since almost all of its functions have been assumed by NATO, and in some cases by the European Union. The WEU Treaty on mutual assistance still exists, however, since it covers some aspects of security not dealt with elsewhere. An independent Scotland would probably automatically become a party to it under international law regulating the succession of states.
Public opinion in Scotland is totally opposed to weapons of mass destruction (atomic, biological, chemical, radiological). Therefore, a constitutional ban should be imposed in Scotland on all such weapons as well as others like the illegal anti-personnel land mines that have murdered and maimed innumerable civilians, and Scotland should sign the relevant international treaties outlawing them. There must be close cooperation in the international efforts to prevent the spread of these weapons as well as their ballistic carrier systems.
The Trident submarine-carried ballistic missile system is already approaching its phasing-out date. It has no conceivable strategic value, and any politico-diplomatic value to the United Kingdom will no longer concern an independent Scotland. The proposed updating is in conflict with the UK’s international treaty obligations. When it is removed the Faslane base can be converted to non-nuclear Scottish requirements.
Scotland must continue and step up the existing close cooperation on security issues with Interpol, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and other international non-military security agencies. There must be particularly close coordination with England, Wales and Ireland over the entire spectrum of security issues like illegal immigration, drug-running, money laundering, smuggling of persons and so on. There must be no unilateral action (e.g. entry to the Schengen system of open frontiers) except in agreement with the other partners.
The plan to establish a campus to coordinate the activities of the various Scottish law enforcement organisations is an essential step towards ensuring the effectiveness of the Scottish security forces at home as well as enhancing their vital links with foreign national agencies and the relevant international organisations. Such innovative approaches are necessary in order to cope with organised international crime.
The armed forces necessary to implement Scottish security policy, and to be made available to the United Nations for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, should be similar to those of the Scandinavian countries, which are comparable as regards population size, geographical terrain and territorial waters. In the light of their experience the following Scottish force structures may serve as a suggested basis for further evaluation:
Land force: Around 8,000 professional personnel in regimental battalions as well as logistics and technical units, backed up by a volunteer militia force with local companies. If organised in two brigades, one brigade, consisting mainly of professionals, should be in a state of short-term readiness with one ever-ready battalion constantly available.
Naval force: In addition to conducting littoral operations in home waters, the navy must have the capability to participate in NATO’s Standing Naval Force as well as the NATO Response Force. The number and types of operational and flexible support vessels must be assessed in the light of these requirements, which include amphibious operational capability. All vessels must be capable of operating helicopters. Scottish shipyards should benefit by orders for frigates and also a new class of vessel designed for coastguard and fisheries protection functions as well as a full naval role.
Air force: This should be organised in three wings: One consisting of two squadrons of attack aircraft capable of maintaining at least a dozen operational machines in the air at any time for airspace surveillance and policing; a transport and auxiliary wing with C130 and similar aircraft, also available for civilian functions; and a helicopter wing with large-capacity machines such as the Sikorsky Black Hawk for troop transport as well as search and rescue and disaster relief. The question of one or two AWACS early-warning aircraft should be considered, in view of Scotland’s vast sea areas as well as NATO requirements.
It is essential that these services should be fully inter-operational, and be capable of forming a self-contained task force at battalion strength without external assistance. There must be regular secondments from all services for Special Forces training, since these units have an enhanced importance over the entire spectrum of anti-terrorist and similar operations.
It is practicable and desirable to retain the existing local connections for both regular and militia forces as an aid to esprit de corps, and not least to uphold one of the most traditional features of Scottish national life.